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This Essay is an attempt to go back to some of the principles and factors which lay behind the
launching of the Uruguay Round and the package which resulted, to look at some of the current
unease about the WTO, and to see where the institution may need to go to reassert its role to
command fully public and political confidence once again.
CONCLUDING THE URUGUAY ROUND-
CREATING THE NEW ARCHITECTURE
OF TRADE FOR THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY
Peter D. Sutherland*
Just a few days before Christmas 1993, I had the privilege to
gavel a final decision to conclude seven years of negotiations to
create a new world trading system. The Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade1 ("GATT") had come
to an end. There was no doubting the huge satisfaction with this
accomplishment. The unprecedented package of new trade
rules and market concessions, along with the basic principles on
which a new world trade body would be constituted, were wel-
comed by negotiators, the media, governments, and business
leaders everywhere. It was seen as a triumph of multilateralism
over the laws of the jungle, a means to help ensure a new eco-
nomic stimulus in the wealthy industrialized countries and the
opportunity for successful growth and development among
poorer nations.
It is as well to remember that sense of achievement and
hope seven short years ago. It took a little over a further year to
finally establish the World Trade Organization2 ("WTO"), which
took over for GATT, as the authority and framework for global
trading conditions. It did so at what seemed a propitious mo-
ment in twentieth century history. The Cold War had ended;
many nations were making the transition from centrally-con-
trolled to free-market economies; China was emerging as a pow-
erful commercial force; many developing countries were under-
taking their own much-needed economic reforms; and we were
all beginning to understand the central elements of growing
* Former Director-General of GATI and the first Director-General of the WTO.
Chairman BP Amoco and Chairman Goldman Sachs International.
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
16 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
global interdependence, which we now refer to as "globaliza-
tion."
The WTO seemed in tune with each of those trends. In-
deed, even before its conclusion, the Uruguay Round had been
a driving force for autonomous trade and economic liberaliza-
tion. With the package in place and the institution a concrete
reality, there seemed every reason to be optimistic that this was
an approach to global economic management which would de-
liver major benefits across societies of every kind; it would be an
inspiration and a great force for good. For, those of us who be-
lieve in the multilateral trading system do so not simply .because
it helps create wealth, but because it provides a reason for na-
tions to find harmony in commerce where they cannot always do
so in other aspects of their relations.
I am not one of those who believe the WTO has failed. I
intend to describe later why I believe the institution has largely
lived up to much of the early promise. Nevertheless, the Ministe-
rial Meeting in Seattle in 1999, and much that has been said
before and since, suggests that, rightly or wrongly, there is a cri-
sis of confidence in the system. Some developing countries have
said that they have not seen the benefits that they expected and
have had difficulties implementing their own commitments to
the WTO. Some industrial countries are frustrated that the pro-
cess of extending the trade rules into new areas has been frus-
trated by a lack of consensus in Geneva. Non-governmental or-
ganizations are concerned that the WTO is acting against their
causes, or, in contrast, that they have not been able to harness
fully the force of the institution to further their objectives.
Is the apparent dissatisfaction with the WTO well founded?
I believe it is not, even if there may be a case for some institu-
tional reform and a need to tackle a number of complaints
squarely. Equally, I believe that much of the suspicion, misun-
derstanding, and misrepresentation of the institution is due to a
tendency to forget its essential principles coupled with a failure
to accept its limitations.
What follows is an attempt to go back to some of the princi-
ples and factors which lay behind the launching of the Uruguay
Round and the package which resulted, to look at some of the
current unease about the WTO, and to see where the institution
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may need to go to reassert its role to command fully public and
political confidence once again.
In essence, there are few differences of principle between
the WTO and GATT.3 Both sets of rules have non-discrimina-
tion as central pillars. Thus, governments should not discrimi-
nate between the countries of origin of like goods and services
(Most-Favored Nation treatment),' nor within markets between
like foreign and domestic goods and services (national treat-
ment) .' Those simple concepts have been enough to spread the
benefits of market access concessions agreed between the major
players in global trade far and wide over the past half century.
This is the basis on which the small and weak economies gain
from the system.
A second fundamental principle, common to both institu-
tions, has been that of transparency.6 Traders and investors, no
less than their governments, have a right to know what the rules
of the game are in any market and how those rules are adminis-
tered. A third principle, which separates GATT and the WTO
from other multilateral institutions, is the contractual nature of
membership, but membership is entirely voluntary of course.7
But the terms of accession are carefully negotiated-over no less
than fourteen years, so far, in the case of China-and are bind-
ing. Commitments made cannot be withdrawn unless a price is
paid as compensation. Again, it is a principle that provides guar-
antees to the weak against arbitrary actions by governments in
key export markets.
Afourth principle of the institutions has been decision-mak-
ing by consensus.' Although voting is possible and does take
place in particular but limited circumstances, decisions on all
points of principle, and certainly with respect to rule making,
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 61 Stat. A- 1,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
4. See id. art. 1; General Agreement on, Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1B, art. 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1180 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, art. 4,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol: 31, 33 I.L.M. 1200 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
5. See GATT art. 3; GATS art. 17; TRIPS art. 3.
6. See TRIPS art. 63, para. 2.
7. WTO Agreement art. XIV.
8. WTO Agreement art. IX.
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are taken after a lengthy and often difficult process of consensus
building. Any GATT or WTO member had, and has, the oppor-
tunity to object and, if necessary, block a decision. And that,
again, puts power into the hands of nations with little, if any,
weight in world trade but who may believe their national inter-
ests are likely to be undermined by proposals being promoted by
others. The consensus habit may be frustrating for those who
want to see fast and determined movement, but it is a necessary
safeguard and the natural concomitant of a contractual system
in which failure to live up to commitments and rules can be
sanctioned-and comparatively easily so in the WTO.
It is worth recalling, therefore, that every one of the four
underlying principles of the old GATT and the new WTO exist
to provide balance and equity. In a sense, they empower mem-
bers of the trading community who otherwise have no influence
on how the elephants behave to look after their own interests.
These then were, and are, the principles. Based on such
foundations, GATT succeeded in opening up much of the global
market for merchandise over some forty years. Through its rela-
tively weak dispute settlement procedure, it was able to contain
trade frictions and maintain the coherence of the "contract" its
growing membership had entered into.
But despite several rounds of trade negotiations, culminat-
ing in the Tokyo Round, between 1973 and 1979, it became
clear that the institution of GATT, no matter how well founded
and successful, was lacking. Following the oil shocks of the
1970s and the debt and other financial crises of the early 1980s,
it became clear to many governments that a more supportive
and comprehensive trading system was needed. What were the
shortcomings?
First, even in the area of trade in merchandise goods, GATT
had too many loopholes. In one key area, agriculture, on which
much of the world depends for its export potential, GATT con-
tained almost no disciplines to counter the increased use of sub-
sidies and the tight constraints on market access maintained by
large parts of the industrial world. In another sector, textiles
and clothing, which is usually the staple export of developing
countries seeking to advance towards more sophisticated and
higher value-added manufactures, one vast exception permitted
the main industrial-country markets to block access at will. The
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Multifibre Arrangement9 ("MFA") had been in place one way or
another for some twenty years as a "temporary" cushion for Eu-
ropean and American companies to adjust to the competition
from low-cost producers elsewhere. Not only had it survived, it
had been steadily reinforced.
Second, even where GATT had been most successful, in the
field of reducing tariffs on goods, there were large black spots:
notably in agriculture, clothing, and textiles, but also in footwear
and goods like steel and chemicals where high import tariffs or
anti-dumping duties sometimes served less to protect domestic
manufacturers than to penalize consumers and other producing
industries which needed the inputs. Tariff escalation, where
producers were discouraged from diversifying and investing to
produce downstream items because of increasingly prohibitive
tariff rates for processed or manufactured products in their ex-
port markets, was a major problem for developing nations.
Third, in the eyes of many industrial countries, the trading
system needed to be brought up to date to reflect the realities of
trade in the last quarter of the twentieth century. That meant,
for a start, designing some trade rules to support the rapid
growth in services trade-financial services, telecommunica-
tions, tourism, travel, professional services, and so on. It also
meant recognizing that trade went hand-in-hand with the trans-
fer or the protection of intellectual property. Further, it meant
accepting that trade rules did not just apply at the frontier, but
reached into many domestic policy areas; in particular, those re-
lated to foreign investment rules, as well as to subsidies, techni-
cal standards, public health and safety interests, and so on.
Fourth, almost all GATT members at the time accepted that
the dispute settlement system needed redesigning and toughen-
ing. Too many dispute settlement panel findings were being ig-
nored and there were almost no circumstances in which compli-
ance could be enforced if a government chose to ignore them or
simply prevaricate for years.
Finally, there was a view that the piecemeal approach to de-
veloping new trade commitments was creating a fragmented sys-
tem with several levels of membership. Since the 1960s, new
agreements had often been negotiated among small groups of
9. Multifibre Arrangement, Formerly 'the Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
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countries, and membership of such accords was entirely volun-
tary. This approach reached its outer limits in the Tokyo Round
when some nine agreements, or "codes," were concluded on the
basis of selective memberships. These included rules on govern-
ment procurement, technical barriers to trade, subsidies, and
anti-dumping. This latter issue was key to the manner in which
the Uruguay Round was launched and is central to the problems
we are now experiencing with respect to the capacity of some
countries to implement the many new commitments which were
entailed in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.
When the new trade round was launched in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986, it was decided that the negotiation
and its conclusion would be a "single undertaking." That meant
that nothing could be agreed until everything was agreed. It also
meant that there would be no first and second-class passengers
in the new global trade system. While special arrangements
might be agreed to cushion or delay the pressures on developing
nations during implementation, they would essentially have to
sign up to precisely the same commitments as the advanced in-
dustrial countries.
The "single undertaking" had many effects. It made the
conclusion of any final agreement much more difficult, espe-
cially since, during the currency of the round, GATT member-
ship moved from eighty-six to around 125. It also meant that the
majority of developing countries spent most of the negotiation
seeking to constrain the level of possible new commitments
rather than pursuing an independent, positive agenda of their
own.
Thankfully, most developing and transition-economy coun-
tries, over the seven years of the Uruguay Round, came to accept
that they had significant interests of their own in most of the new
issues being negotiated. Many had very significant influence in
the drafting of the new agreements, although their deepest and
most effective involvement came after the fundamental, concep-
tual work had been largely concluded. However, it is often
claimed now that the developing countries played no role in the
Uruguay Round and that the agreements essentially were foisted
upon them by the members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). This charge bears
further examination.
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It is a damaging falsity to claim that GATT paid no attention
to the interests of the developing countries and, indeed, effec-
tively failed to involve them in decision-making. For a start,
more than half of the original twenty-three founding members
of GATT in 1948 were developing countries. Development inter-
ests were recognized in the rules of GATT, thus providing flexi-
bility, for instance, in the treatment of infant industries. In the
1960s and 1970s, further special conditions were added: first,
"special and differential treatment" for poorer countries and,
second, the "enabling clause," which permitted non-reciprocal
preferential market access to be offered to such nations. In ret-
rospect it might be argued that these special arrangements have
done little to help developing countries integrate fully into the
global economy-the most successful among them have had lit-
tle or no recourse to the provisions-but the particular chal-
lenges faced by poorer nations have always been recognized.
In reality, many developing countries have played a big role
in the construction of the trading system since its inception as
GATT. Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Singapore, and,
more recently, Mexico and Morocco are among the numerous
nations that have sent their best people to Geneva and have
been both vocal and effective in GATT and WTO negotiations.
But if GATT and WTO are binding contractual agreements, it
has been those with most to offer in the contract who have been
the most forceful. Developing countries and smaller industrial
countries alike have all relied on the U.S. and European markets
for their export growth. In turn, the United States and the Euro-
pean Community have taken a mercantilist view of their obliga-
tions: their markets have been progressively opened and, for the
most part, kept open through binding commitments on the un-
derstanding that American and European exporters would see
new opportunities in other markets. It has been a bargaining
pact reflecting unequal economic power, for sure, but it has
been a process founded on rules, checks, and balances. It is not
a balance of economic power that is necessarily for all time. On
the contrary, it is already changing to reflect the economic suc-
cess of East Asia and will undoubtedly change radically with
China squarely a part of the trading system in the future.
However, whatever the power balance within the system, no
trade round has been a zero-sum game; it has never been a mat-
ter of a few winners and many losers, all have come away with
2000]
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new opportunities. The success stories in world trade have
known how, and had the capacity, to use those opportunities.
This is a fundamental point. We despair of Africa's hopes of
economic development and its integration into the global econ-
omy, but let us be clear: access to markets, negotiated or offered
through the WTO, is just one small part of the puzzle. Produc-
tive capacity, an educated and skilled workforce, credible and
efficient customs services, investment-friendly business environ-
ments, non-corrupt administration of trade rules, as well as
peace and physical security are every bit as crucial in the equa-
tion. Trade success is not generated through market access; on
the contrary, market access has value only if other elements are
in place.
This is not to say the playing field was particularly flat or fair
at the beginning of the Uruguay Round. As I have noted al-
ready, two of the most important trade sectors for developing
and many other nations-agriculture and textiles and cloth-
ing-had been major black spots of GATT. These, as well as the
new issues like services, intellectual property, dispute settlement,
and a multitude of rule-making mandates, were included in the
negotiating agenda agreed to September 1996.
It became the greatest negotiating marathon in history.
Seven years later, weary negotiators walked away from the table
with a package of 560 pages of new trade rules, a new institu-
tion-the WTO-and around 23,000 pages of national market
access commitments affecting trade in goods and services. Even
for advanced industrial countries, it was a daunting achievement
whose assimilation through parliamentary or congressional rati-
fication, public information, and legal and practical implemen-
tation was a challenge. The question is whether the package
achieved what was necessary in providing a credible trading sys-
tem for the new millennium? It is a question deserving a
thoughtful response since it is the basis of much current disillu-
sionment with the-WTO.
Let us start with agriculture and the textiles and clothing
sectors. The Uruguay Round results for farm trade can best be
described as "turning the tide." This was a sector suffering from
decades of increasing protection and ever-rising financial sup-
port in the EC and the United States. Other countries, includ-
ing developing countries, had their own protection and support
[Vol. 24:15
CONCLUDING THE URUGUAY ROUND
programs, while a significant group of competitive agricultural
producers-notably the countries of the Cairns Group'-were
pressing for a radical change that would place farmers on the
same footing as manufacturers of industrial goods.
The process of negotiation was helped by the first signs that
the financial strains on the EC budget were becoming over-
whelming and that consumers and taxpayers were less and less
willing to foot the bill. Indeed, well before the conclusion of the
round, the EC had adopted internal reforms. These reforms
eventually were subsumed into, and supplemented by, the final
Uruguay Round package. But what did the package amount to?
First, it set aside the vastly complicated, non-transparent and
discriminatory assortment of quantitative restrictions on market
access for farm products.1 These were required to be trans-
posed into bound tariffs, which, while they only minimally added
to market access at that stage, could be reduced progressively in
further negotiating rounds. Second, the deal imposed a reduc-
tion commitment-in terms of both volume and expenditure-
on export subsidies. This form of financial support had permit-
ted the large scale dumping of agricultural commodities on
world markets and had been the biggest dampener of all on the
prospects of competitive, unsubsidized farmers everywhere.
The third element of the farm trade agreement was a wind-
ing back of domestic support for farmers. More important, gov-
ernments were pushed to support their farmers through policies
that were less trade distorting. The deal left open many routes
for countries to ensure that farmers stay on their land, but also
cut back the scope to damage the trade interests of others.
Fourth, a new agreement was concluded to ensure that policies
and standards to safeguard human, animal, and plant health and
safety did not operate as unwarranted barriers to trade. 2 The
agreement permitted governments to impose standards that
10. The Cairns Group "was set up just before the Uruguay Round began in 1986 to
argue for agricultural trade liberalization." See Trading into the Future: The Introduc-
tion to the WTO at www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/org3_e.htm. The
following countries were members of the Cairns group: Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay
(which joined in 1997), the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. Id.
11. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 4A, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm.
12. See Agreement on Safeguards, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
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were higher than those generally applied but required such in-
creased levels of protection to be based on credible science or
risk assessment.
The first three elements of the Agreement on Agriculture
did not open up farm trade in a big way. Instead, they served
essentially to stop the drift and to set in motion a U-turn in poli-
cies. It was recognized that this was only a start and the Agree-
ment on Agriculture mandated new negotiations at a later stage.
These were, in fact, launched earlier this year and should lead to
further, more significant commitments.
Textiles and clothing was no less a politically sensitive and
over-protected sector than farming. The institutional framework
for normally illegal quota protection was set squarely in GATT.
No trade policy instrument was more disliked by developing
countries, which have traditionally seen textiles and clothing ex-
ports as their best initial non-agricultural entry into world'trade,
than the MFA. It was a truly Byzantine structure that required
literally thousands of civil servants at ports and in capitals to ad-
ministrate. Almost every major industrial country had used the
MFA to negotiate or impose hundreds of quotas covering dozens
of products with each low-cost supplying country. It was ajungle
in which consumers lost out through higher prices for their
clothes, few industrial country firms finally survived, and the only
financial winners were the companies holding the quotas.
The answer was a transfer of all quotas into a new agree-
ment, which required their phased dismantling over a period of
ten years. It is a matter of regret that the United States and the
European Union chose to delay the dismantling of quotas on the
products of real interest to developing countries until the last
possible point in the transition process. There is probably no
element among the implementation problems associated with
the Uruguay Round that has caused more resentment among
poorer nations than this, some would say, cynical manipulation
of the textiles agreement by the major players in world trade.
Indeed, resentment has been all the more acute since other
aspects of the Uruguay Round package, of interest principally to
the industrial countries, required considerable reform efforts on
the part of poorer nations. None more so than the so-called
TRIPS agreement. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights ("TRIPS"), for the first time, made intellectual prop-
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erty protection via patents, copyright, trademarks, and other in-
struments mandatory and enforceable. Even if the agreement
granted lengthy transition terms and several let-outs to develop-
ing countries, the reality remains that they were required to leg-
islate and to put administrative and enforcement facilities in
place where, often, they had, and have, no regulation at all.
Most have recognized that intellectual property protection was
very much in their interests, especially since it is a pre-requisite
for much inward investment. Nevertheless, some have perceived
an imbalance in the demands made upon them and have had
second thoughts about certain aspects of the agreement-on
pharmaceuticals and patents on biotechnology for instance.
The agreement on services, normally referred to as the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Service ("GATS"), was even more
groundbreaking and, yet, less of a cause of resentment than
TRIPS. That is probably because of the gradualist approach to
WTO members making commitments in the sector. The agree-
ment was constructed to allow governments to make and lock in
reforms in areas like financial services, telecommunications,
tourism, and professional services, but to do so on a negotiated
basis in the light of perceived national interests. By the time the
specific sector negotiations on telecommunications and finan-
cial services had been concluded in 1998, there is no doubt that
many countries had been able to use GATS as a crucial instru-
ment in their efforts to integrate into the global economy and to
reap the benefits of modern communications and access to capi-
tal.
Yet, I do not believe the process is even halfway complete in
services, especially in terms of the potential benefits that could
flow to developing countries. It is no longer the case that their
horizons should rise no further than tourism and construction
services. There is a diverse set of services sectors in which poorer
countries have, or could easily have, a comparative advantage;
among them healthcare, audiovisual, transport, some profes-
sional services, and others. It is clear to me that deyeloping
countries probably have a bigger future in services than in many
traditional manufacturing sectors. And that is one reason why I
believe they should take the maximum advantage from the
promise of a new round of trade negotiations in the WTO.
The final Uruguay Round package contained much else, of
course. Notably in the field of rule-making where new agree-
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ments on anti-dumping, subsidies, and countervailing mea-
sures, 13 safeguards,' 4 technical barriers to trade, 15 customs valua-
tion,16 and pre-shipment inspection' 7 brought the old disci-
plines up to date. With the exception of the government
procurements and civil aircraft agreements, 9 all these new
rules became applicable to all WTO members, even if their ap-
plication was delayed in some respects. Some rules, like customs
valuation-which requires properly functioning and efficient
customs administrations in order to be implemented effec-
tively-and investment-where practices like local-content re-
quirements are outlawed-along with the TRIPS agreement,
have been the subjects of further negotiations to secure, for a
few countries, longer phase-in periods than otherwise permitted.
What has been described as the 'jewel in the crown" of the
Uruguay Round was the new dispute settlement procedure.20
The earlier GATT system had had its successes. Around 150 dis-
putes were treated over almost fifty years. However, while settle-
ment was secured in a good number-either through bilateral
consultations or following final panel rulings-many cases were
left on the table through endless blocking tactics. Even where
panel rulings were formally adopted, they often were not imple-
mented to the satisfaction of the complainant government. The
new WTO system has already shown itself to be of impressive
weight and credibility, with member governments bringing well
over 200 cases in just five years.
The new process is largely automatic with the scope for
13. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/final-e.htm.
14. See Agreement on Safeguards WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/Iegal_e/finale.htm.
15. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm.
16. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legal-e/final-e.htm.
17. See Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. 15, 1994, wTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final e.htm.
18. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 4(b), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
19. See Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex 4(a), at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/final-e.htm.
20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
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blocking tactics reduced to virtually zero. While there is some-
times still criticism over the time taken to reach a final outcome
in WTO disputes, the record shows that the system measures up
well against other forms of commercial litigation.
However, the most important innovation was concerned
with the implementation of the adopted dispute settlement re-
ports. With the WTO, a heavy new weapon was put in the hands
of countries securing rulings against other members. Failure to
implement can lead relatively quickly to demands for compensa-
tion that, if not forthcoming, lead further to almost automatic
clearance for trade retaliation. This has not been a frequent oc-
currence, but there are some celebrated cases in which retalia-
tion has not only been granted but imposed.
Naturally, with such a heavy, self-propelled system in place,
there needed to be some extra checks and balances. The most
significant of these was the constitution of an appeals mecha-
nism after the panel examination of disputes. The Appellate
Body of the WTO has been a ground-breaker in many respects
and has helped to provide political acceptability to a system,
which, when pushing governments towards making legislative or
regulatory changes, can create disquiet among domestic special
interest groups.
This last point is perhaps one of the keys to the difficulties
that the WTO has faced in the last few years. The uniquely
tough system of dispute settlements is, at the same time, both the
best and the worst feature of the new institution. At its best, the
system has served to reduce trade tensions between governments
through objective judgements based on WTO law and to provide
relatively speedy and effective remedies for businesses that find
themselves tangled in unreasonable government intervention in
markets. At this level the system commands great respect. But it
commands respect at another, less welcome level also. Outside
the narrow confines of commercial disputes, there is a view that
the WTO dispute system is a great potential gift-though, for
some, a threat-to many causes largely unrelated to trade. Be-
cause no other multilateral body, and certainly none within the
United Nations family, has such an instrument, those who pro-
mote such causes are turning to the WTO for responses that can-
not be secured elsewhere. So it is that labor rights, the environ-
ment, and wider "human rights" have increasingly become part
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of the debate on the future of the WTO and trade agreements
generally.
Now, it may well be that there are aspects of these ques-
tions-particularly in the case of the environment-which are
entirely appropriate for the WTO. There are, for instance, real
direct links between certain environmental issues and trade
rules. But the view that the WTO is an all-purpose vehicle for
achieving any and all objectives no matter how remote is the link
with trade is, in my view, a threat to the future efficient function-
ing of the system. Many improvements to "human rights" may
well flow from increasing trade and from the integration of
countries into the global economy, but making trade conces-
sions dependent on a range of non-trade related prerequisites is
a sure path to the further impoverishment of the very people we
all seek to assist.
Ironically, such an approach also feeds the notion that the
WTO is already so all-powerful that it is imposing itself in areas
where it has no remit. This is the mirror image of the former
argument, but it is perhaps of even more concern. Thus, we find
critics of the multilateral trading system charging that the WTO
prevents governments from enforcing their own environmental
standards, from safeguarding public health through the applica-
tion of the precautionary principles, from taking discriminatory
trade measures against countries not living up to human rights
or labor standards, or from protecting national cultural identity
or the right to public health and education services. Sometimes,
such arguments reflect the view that the WTO is a supranational
organization taking sovereignty out of the hands of national leg-
islatures and executives.
In almost every instance these charges are entirely false. Far
from taking power away from national governments, the multi-
lateral, rules-based trading system actually restores some govern-
ment oversight in a global economy that is out of the control of
most capitals. The real danger is that the dispute settlement sys-
tem of the WTO is being used increasingly to seek to resolve
major policy issues that are more properly the prerogative of
member governments acting collectively. In other words, there
is a threat of too much litigation and not enough legislation to
determine the changing boundaries of the trading system's legal
responsibilities.
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That brings us, finally, to the question of a new round of
trade negotiations, for that is the only practical basis on which
WTO members can negotiate and legislate across a broad span
of concerns. There is no doubt that another trade round could
be a burden for some developing countries: an adequate re-
sponse to their lack of capacity to negotiate and take on new
obligations is needed urgently. At the same time, even just seven
years after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the global
economy has moved on and is presenting a variety of new chal-
lenges to the WTO. As I have said, such challenges need to be
met not by litigation and decisions by trade experts in dispute
settlement panels, but by the governments of WTO members en-
gaging fully in negotiation.
The Uruguay Round created a credible, powerful, and ex-
traordinarily far-sighted structure of trade rules and commercial
opportunities for the new millennium. It did not and could not
complete the job. Like any institution, it must go on adapting,
even if the principles of the system are as valid and valuable now
as they were more than half a century ago when GATT was cre-
ated.
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